

**COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA
PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS AND PRACTICES COMMISSION**

DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION,	:	
Petitioner,	:	
	:	
	:	
v.	:	DOCKET NO. DI-20-020
	:	
MICHAEL W. HELLER,	:	
Respondent.	:	

ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

This matter is before the Professional Standards and Practices Commission (“Commission”) on a Notice of Charges and Motion for Summary Judgment filed by the Department of Education (“Department”). After consideration of the record in this matter and the applicable law, the Commission finds that summary judgment in favor of the Department is appropriate and enters this Order as follows:

BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Michael W. Heller (“Respondent”) was employed as a charter school staff member¹ at the Young Scholars Frederick Douglas Charter School n/k/a Frederick Douglas Mastery Charter School for the 2011-2012 school year. At all times relevant to this matter, Respondent was employed as a principal by the Readsboro Central School in the state of Vermont. The Department initiated disciplinary proceedings against Respondent with the filing of a Notice of Charges on February 6, 2020. The Notice of

1. “CHARTER OR CYBER CHARTER SCHOOL STAFF MEMBER’ shall mean an individual employed by a charter or cyber charter school in a position for which certification would be required in a public school other than a charter or cyber charter school but who is not required to hold certification under section 1724-A of the act of March 10, 1949 (P.L. 30, No. 14), known as the ‘Public School Code of 1949.’ The term includes an individual who is an administrator, including the chief administrator or the individual with primary responsibility for the administration of the charter or cyber charter school.” 24 P.S. § 2070.1b. Charter or cyber charter school staff members are considered educators under the Educator Discipline Act. Id.

Charges alleges that Respondent was convicted of the Vermont crime of Embezzlement, which the Department asserts is a crime involving moral turpitude. Certified copies of the pertinent court documents are attached to the Notice of Charges. Simultaneous with the filing of the Notice of Charges, the Department filed a Motion for Summary Judgment requesting that the Commission enter summary judgment in its favor and revoke Respondent's employment eligibility based upon his conviction.

As required, the Department mailed copies of the Notice of Charges and Motion for Summary Judgment to Respondent at his last-known address. Respondent did not file an answer to either pleading.

The Commission heard oral argument at its regularly scheduled meeting on May 11, 2020. Respondent was not present.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

Summary Judgment is appropriate only when, after examining the whole record in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Snyder v. Department of Environmental Resources, 588 A.2d 1001 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1991).

MATERIAL FACTS

The material facts are not in dispute.² On July 28, 2014, Respondent was convicted in the Vermont Superior Court, Bennington Unit, of the crime of Embezzlement, 13 V.S.A. § 2531(a). The facts underlying the conviction are that Respondent misappropriated and misused school grant funds.

2. Since Respondent did not file a responsive pleading, the only facts considered by the Commission are those alleged in the Notice of Charges, which the Commission deems admitted. See 22 Pa. Code § 233.115(c)(1); 1 Pa. Code § 35.37; See also Kinniry v. Professional Standards and Practices Commission, 678 A.2d 1230 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1996).

DISCUSSION

The Department seeks the revocation of Respondent's employment eligibility pursuant to section 9b(a)(2) of the Educator Discipline Act ("Act"). 24 P.S. § 2070.9b(a)(2). That section mandates, in relevant part, that the Commission shall direct the Department to revoke the certificate and employment eligibility of an educator convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude upon the filing of a certified copy of the verdict, judgment or sentence of the court with the Commission. Id.³ The Commission's regulations define moral turpitude, in relevant part, as follows:

(a) *Definition.* Moral turpitude includes the following:

(1) That element of personal misconduct in the private and social duties which a person owes to his fellow human beings or to society in general, which characterizes the act done as an act of baseness, vileness or depravity, and contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and duty between two human beings.

(2) Conduct done knowingly contrary to justice, honesty or good morals.

...

22 Pa. Code § 237.9. Similarly, the Commonwealth Court has defined moral turpitude as "anything done knowingly contrary to justice, honesty, or good morals." Gombach v. Department of State, Bureau of Comm'ns, Elections & Legislation, 692 A.2d 1127, 1130 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1997). A crime of moral turpitude requires a requires a reprehensible state of mind or *mens rea*. Bowalick v. Commonwealth, 840 A.2d 519, 523-24 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2004). Crimes in which fraud is an ingredient have always been regarded as involving moral turpitude. Moretti v. State Board of Pharmacy, 277 A.2d 516 (Pa.

3. The term conviction includes a plea of guilty or nolo contendere. 24 P.S. § 2070.9b(a)(2).

Cmwlth.1971); citing Jordan v. DeGeorge, 341 U.S. 223, 71 S.Ct. 703 (1951) (fraud is the touchstone of moral turpitude).

Here, the Department has presented the Commission with certified court records of Respondent's conviction for Embezzlement. The Department seeks a determination that this crime involves moral turpitude. The Commission is required to make its assessment "based solely upon the elements of the crime." 22 Pa. Code § 237.9(b); See also Startzel v. Commonwealth, Department of Education, 562 A.2d 1005, 1007 (Pa. Cmwlth.1989). The underlying facts or details of a conviction are not relevant to the issue of moral turpitude.

The Vermont crime of Embezzlement is defined, in relevant part, as follows:

Embezzlement generally.

(a) An officer, agent, bailee for hire, clerk, or servant of a banking association or an incorporated company, or a clerk, agent, bailee for hire, officer, or servant of a private person, partnership, trades union, joint stock company, unincorporated association, fraternal or benevolent association, except apprentices and other persons under the age of 16 years, who embezzles or fraudulently converts to his or her own use, or takes or secretes with intent to embezzle or fraudulently convert to his or her own use, money or other property that comes into his or her possession or is under his or her care by virtue of such employment, notwithstanding he or she may have an interest in such money or property, shall be guilty of embezzlement.

13 V.S.A. § 2531(a). Certainly, this crime requires conduct "contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and duty," 22 Pa. Code § 237.9(a)(1), and conduct "done knowingly contrary to justice, honesty or good morals," 22 Pa. Code § 237.9(a)(2), and thus a "reprehensible state of mind or *mens rea*." Bowalick, 840 A.2d at 524. Fraud is also an essential ingredient of this crime. Therefore, the Commission concludes that the Vermont crime of Embezzlement is a crime of moral turpitude. The Commonwealth

Court has also recognized that crimes involving theft are crimes of moral turpitude. See Krystal Jeep Eagle, Inc. v. Bureau of Prof'l & Occupational Affairs, 725 A.2d 846 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1999) (theft by deception and theft by failure to make required disposition of funds received); Ancharski v. Bureau of Prof'l & Occupational Affairs, State Bd. of Nursing (Pa. Cmwlth. No. 1765 C.D. 2010, file June 21, 2011) (theft by unlawful taking or disposition); Spence v. Bureau of Prof'l & Occupational Affairs (Pa. Cmwlth. No. 1692 C.D. 2009, filed March 22, 2010) (theft by unlawful taking or disposition).⁴

Because Respondent has been convicted of a crime of moral turpitude, the Commission must direct the Department to revoke Respondent's employment eligibility. 24 P.S. § 2070.9b(a)(2); See also Bowalick, 840 A.2d at 522 (revocation of a teaching certificate on summary judgment is appropriate upon proof of a conviction of a crime of moral turpitude); citing Kinniry v. Professional Stds. & Practices Comm'n, 678 A.2d 1230, 1234 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1996).⁵

ORDER

AND NOW, this 24th day of June 2020, upon consideration of the Department of Education's Motion for Summary Judgment and the lack of response thereto, it is hereby ORDERED:

1. The Motion for Summary Judgment is Granted.
2. Pursuant to 24 P.S. § 2070.9b(a)(2), the Department is directed to revoke

4. Ancharski and Spence are cited herein for their persuasive value pursuant to 210 Pa. Code § 69.414(a).

5. Our General Assembly has determined that in those cases where an educator is convicted of an offense compelling revocation under section 9b of the Act, an appeal from the Commission's adjudication will not delay the imposition of discipline. 24 P.S. § 2070.15. Therefore, the revocation of Respondent's employment eligibility will be effective immediately.

Respondent's eligibility to be employed as a charter or cyber charter school staff member or a contracted educational provider staff member effective on the date of this Order.

3. Respondent is not eligible to be employed as a charter or cyber charter school staff member or contracted educational provider staff member, or eligible for any certificate until his employment eligibility is reinstated in accordance with the Act.

PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS AND
PRACTICES COMMISSION

By: 

Myron Yoder
Chairperson Pro Tempore



Attest:

Shane F. Crosby
Executive Director

Date Mailed: June 24, 2020